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    The impacts of ownership concentration on corporate performance have always been 
an important issue in corporate governance. Reasonable degree of ownership 
concentration plays a very important role in the long-term healthy development of listed 
companies. However, in recent years the ownership of listed companies in China still 
maintains high concentration and their performance levels are general. The situation of 
major shareholders encroaching on the interests of minority shareholders is common. And 
the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance is 
increasingly catching social widespread attention. 
First of all, this essay introduces the England-America mode and Japan-Germany 
mode, two kinds of typical mode of ownership structure, comparing with the current 
situation of the ownership structure in China. Then in the empirical study of the impacts 
of ownership concentration on corporate performance I select data of A shares listed 
companies in Shenzhen stock exchange in China. In the framework of multiple regression 
I use the first majority shareholder's shareholding ratio, the top five shareholders' 
shareholding ratio and the quadratic sum of the top five shareholders' shareholding ratio 
as the proxy variables of ownership concentration, Z index as the proxy variable of 
ownership’s balance degree. Uses the return on total assets as the proxy variable of 
operating performance and Tobin's Q ratio as the proxy variable of market performance to 
respectively research the different impacts of ownership concentration on corporate 
performance through incentive effect and occupying effect.  In further study this essay 
also analyzes the curve relationship between ownership concentration and corporate 
performance. 
After the research this essay finds that firstly at present the ownership concentration 
of listed companies in China is higher, but shows a lower trend. Secondly ownership 
concentration and operating performance of listed companies are significantly positive 
correlation. At the present stage of listed companies in China ownership concentration in 
a certain degree can promote the company's operating performance. Thirdly ownership 
concentration and market performance of listed companies are significantly negative 













encroach on the interests of minority shareholders. Fourthly operating and market 
performance of listed companies neither have curve relation with ownership 
concentration. Fifthly Z index and market performance of listed companies are 
significantly negative correlation. This indicates that the strengthening of ownership’s 
balance degree has certain restriction on the embezzlement o f major shareholders. But the 
impact of ownership’s balance degree on operating performance of listed companies is 
not obvious. 
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早在 20 世纪 70、80 年代的美国，公司治理相关问题的研究就已经开始兴起。





70 至 80 年代，西方国家的公司治理情况发生了一些变化，机构投资者迅速地兴起
并发展，上市公司之间的敌意收购开始频繁地出现，公司的管理层薪酬过高增长过
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